Justice is Contextual

The following OP is me trying to make sense of flaws I see in the way justice is applied to different groups of people in the US. I also explore ways of going beyond the current paradigm into something more progressive, and, hopefully, more humane.

I begin with a somewhat daunting explanation that should make some sense in context: the term “values” in this post can best be thought of as meaning-laden “measures” associated with a person’s identity that can be referenced against a group of internally hierarchical, or at least graded, categories to determine whether or not a given criterion applies to the person being considered - specifically with regards to criteria dictating the applicability of justice or just treatment. Thus, these measures, although of ambiguous dimensionality, correspond with any theoretical connections between justice and identity when those connections determine the applicability of justice. That is, justice is value-specific. There could be some dirtiness where the logic doesn’t line up perfectly, but I don’t think that really matters too much to the main thrust of the post. Hopefully this more technical explanation is sufficient for understanding how I approach the topic of justice on a descriptive level. If not, please just ask for more elaboration.

I do not think that the enacting of justice is as straightforward as society treats it. It seems that many would say that the application of justice should be done uniformly, and in some ways this position is tenable: if we are each freely choosing agents, standards of justice can reliably be applied to individuals based upon their choices, and if we are products of causality we can still administer a similar justice if we are willing to temper it with compassion. However, since the more fortunate are afforded more opportunities to avoid the challenges those less fortunate must deal with that may lead to disparities in consequences along group lines, I think the application of justice on a group level according to static criteria is not truly justice at all. Rather, it is a de facto expression of privilege because of the way white aggrievement currently reinforces power structures, i.e. justice is, and needs to be treated as being, contextual. This contextuality enables group-level double standards and, simultaneously, implies a more robust version of justice in the form of going past pre-existing group boundaries to correct for mistreatment. I say we should embrace this version of justice.

I know that my thesis might seem overly complex, but I promise that the meat of the post will be rather simple to understand once the type of contextuality (spoiler: it’s value-specificity) I’m commenting on is elaborated. Please just stick with it.

I contend, more specifically, that justice is applied in value-specific ways. An example would best illustrate this. Consider US veterans that have killed enemy combatants or given the order to do so in illegal, immoral wars. Do we prosecute them for that? No, that would be absurd: we pay many of them a disability percentage because we value them and their honorable service above trying to hold them to account for enforcing American hegemony in not-so-good ways (even ignoring all the difficulties that doing that would entail). Clearly the values assigned to an agent or actor are part of what determines the applicability of some criteria of justice to their situation - and I’m not saying there is always something wrong with that, e.g. veterans - but it could clearly lead to disparities in treatment of differently valued groups of people. That is, if people want to embrace this form of contextuality, they must acknowledge that this difference in valuation means that the same, immutable standards of justice will affect different people differently potentially according to group identity. If parity in consequences for different groups matters, this mechanism matters.

To that point, this mechanism is reflected in a sort of recursive process by which, in the face of social progress, many of those with advantageous valuation, and thus privilege, have a tendency towards attempting to invent value-attributing grievances to maintain a semblance of control over those that they judge to be less deserving of justice short of implementing actual segregationist policies. The purpose of this weaponization of privilege is to reinforce stratification and, thus, one’s in-group’s privilege over others, even if the grievances cited are petty, spurious, irrational, etc. While the claim that a white genocide - or some such tripe - is occurring in the US is not explicitly held by all conservatives, those that justify policies to keep minorities down in ways recently seen act similarly to any nascent fascist regime one might consider, and the fact that neo-Nazis can openly attend notable political conferences indicates that that avenue is not entirely blocked off. So, according to the logic of aggrievement built on value-specificity, the continued wellbeing and just treatment of minorities and vulnerable groups is not by any means guaranteed, but that people like Nick Fuentes have freedom of speech (insofar as they aren’t cancelled everywhere) to engage in white supremacist rhetoric is. If that isn’t an expression of privilege, I don’t know what is.

What is to be done, then? I think the right thing to do to interrupt, or at least counter, the process is to level the playing field by allocating extra resources towards rectifying historical inequities and bringing about continued justice for minorities - even if we cannot budge people’s general tendencies toward tribalism; furthermore, we have an opportunity to counteract the misvaluing of groups based upon irrelevant or arbitrary criteria that could be preventing valid grievances from being seriously considered. I know that very last part might be viewed as a strong, and perhaps not totally supported, claim, but I think that any truly just system would implement such a dynamic to try to achieve parity.

In conclusion, the solution to all of this is pretty simple on a strategic level: we listen to what groups of people say they want and need and evaluate if it is situationally reasonable and also if we think that it would be reasonable largely independent of who is asking for it, if at all possible. Thus, if a white supremacist says white people are being systematically affronted by non-white immigrants, for example, they do sometimes need to be countered with an assessment of the validity of their claims - but I think we also need to keep in mind that these are almost certainly attempts at cementing the status of one group over another and are not actually serious. Indeed, I contend that taking these (potentially veiled) white supremacist assertions and arguments as anything other than an explicit threat to the wellbeing of everyone - but especially minorities - is erroneous and will lead to injustice if those making these arguments are allowed even a modicum of power by generalization of pertinent values to large groups of non-white people. This is the reality of the contextuality of justice, and I think that it should be acknowledged as such by those interested in promoting actual fairness.

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Indeed it is not! You are on the mark supposing that economic disparity is a key factor in the way justice is done (or not done). The inequality between wealth and poverty in the performance of justice is so pervasive that it becomes invisible to the well off.

Here is a clear example: A poor man receives a ticket for an illegal right turn on a red light, and will be fined. The $100 fine is much more than he can pay, since his income is always exceeded by basic necessary expenses like rent and food. Eventually he is summoned to appear for payment. Showing up in court requires him to take time off work, which he can not afford to do, so he is a no show. The court could issue a warrant for his arrest. He might be arrested, which will create further costs and loss of income. Perhaps as a result he will lose his job.

Another man with ample resources also receives a ticket for an illegal right hand turn on a red light. Under the rule of “equal justice” he will also be fined $100. When he gets home he writes out a check and mails it in. No further action is required. There are no further consequences.

Is it the fault of a fair system of justice that the consequences of a traffic ticket are so very different for the two men? In a very narrow view of justice, no. But in a wider view, is it fair that a traffic ticket can result in the loss of a job?

No, because there is the matter of “economic justice” where the benefits of laboring are fairly distributed. The American economy (among others) distributes the benefits of working very unevenly and unfairly. It isn’t just uneven between billionaires and the working poor; it is uneven between working people and professionals who are, in many cases, performing no particularly useful work for society, but are paid much more.

Thanks for the response, BC. While my post was not actually oriented towards arguing for “economic justice” on a more individual level such as described in your reply, you offer a thoughtful example of how justice is indeed contextual/situational. If it were the case that we were discussing economic justice along racial or geographic lines, then my formulation of value-specificity would be more salient, and there would perhaps be more to discuss with regards to the OP. That being said, you provide a really good micro-example of how disparities can become invisible to those that have privilege. In the OP I assert that something similar to this may be the case with regards to the misvaluing of groups leading to dismissal of valid grievances - something that can be fixed in my opinion.

Another thought: you could always go the route of arguing for value-specificity purely along class lines, but the subcategory of impoverished people, for example, is so heterogenous that assigning criteria to determine who receives justice probably wouldn’t have any consistency. Or maybe not. I’m not totally sure.

What group(s) were you thinking of that wouldn’t be so heterogeneous?

I totally expected someone to ask that. When I say heterogenous I am referring to the values assigned to the group and not whether or not they all think or act the same way. Thus, in this capacity, a single group being considered, for example, must almost certainly be less heterogenous overall then two groups even if only because of the way the privileged treat them.

When I say heterogenous I am referring to the values assigned to the group and not whether or not they all think or act the same way.

That makes sense, but I’m still not sure how this differentiates ‘the poor’ from some other social group. Are you saying that the values assigned to ‘the poor’ are more heterogeneous than those assigned to some other groups?

I can’t see how that might be the case.

Take your example of veterans. Some may well excuse them of killings in unjust wars, but others may not. Others may be completely on the fence on the matter. The range of assigned values seems no more or less heterogeneous than those assigned to a group like ‘the poor’.

Buy I may still be misunderstanding your point because I’m afraid…

a single group being considered, for example, must almost certainly be less heterogenous overall then two groups even if only because of the way the privileged treat them

… was totally indecipherable for me.

The veteran example was meant to demonstrate how value-specificity functions and should not be taken as something that indicates a lack of heterogeneity across specific groups. Yes, many people might not be inclined towards leniency for veterans, but ultimately what prevents veterans from being prosecuted or something is the specific values they have been assigned by either the majority or those with power. If we were to introduce a new subset of people with their own valuations to a group like “veterans”, the status of veterans as being protected could change, could it not? That is, if standards of justice don’t change?

Thus, if we sum up groups of people assigned their own pre-existing spectrums of values that belong to the group “impoverished”, I think the criteria determining how to bring about justice becomes more and more complex and problematic if we want it to be done consistently across those groups. This is a problem of bloat, not of fundamental attribution.

You’re assuming that ‘impoverished’ is some kind of meta-group in a way that other potential groupings are not? Otherwise I’m still not seeing how such a group is different. Presumably (you mention white privilege), ‘blacks’ might be just the sort of group you’re talking about? Or ‘veterans’ we’ve already had. Or, I suppose, from your suggestion that “we listen to what groups of people say they want and need”, other grievance groups might be included - women, immigrants, the trans community…

I’m not seeing how these have a more heterogeneous set of assigned (or assignable) values than ‘the poor’. They all seem to be very wide-ranging groups with a massive variety of both internal views and external value judgements.

Would you say that trans people and people of color, for example, might have very different, but still valid, grievances?

Yes, I think that would be fair to say. But so might poor people and trans people, or poor people and black people. Certainly for people of colour in the UK (where I am), the numbers are similar. About 11 million people of colour, about 12 million in ‘absolute poverty’.

Why would one group be more or less heterogeneous in either grievance or treatment?

I’m saying that there is more heterogeneity on a group level within the category of impoverished people. Thus, if significant differences in valuation exist between groups like impoverished trans people and impoverished people of color that play into their qualitatively different grievances, trying to assuage those grievances according to a single complex criterion oriented towards the same endpoint of ending ‘absolute poverty’ or some other undesirable state of affairs might get really difficult. I think this conclusion is in keeping with my argument because it emphasizes the need to correct for valuations of specific groups to bring about similar consequences.

I’m saying that there is more heterogeneity on a group level within the category of impoverished people.

On what grounds? It’s certainly not a given. Why would the group ‘people of colour’ exhibit less heterogeneity than the group ‘people in absolute poverty’?

I’ve demonstrated that the numbers are similar, so it’s not group size. So what makes skin colour generate a more homogeneous set of issues than lack of financial means?

I’m saying between the groups that fit into ‘impoverished’, i.e. impoverished people of color and impoverished trans people, there is more heterogeneity in the ways that count if we are linking value to grievance. I agree that within and across the groups ‘people of color’ and ‘people in absolute poverty’, there is similar heterogeneity, but it doesn’t necessarily account for relevant disparities in treatment and is not necessarily part of the solution.

I get what you’re saying. What I’m not getting is any of the justification for it.

What are ‘the ways that count’, and why do they count (presumably as opposed to ways that don’t count)? Similar with ‘relevant’ disparities. why 'relevant? Why are other disparities not 'relevant?

When I say ‘in the ways that count’ or ‘relevant differences’ I mean the ways in which heterogeneity is expressed such that we cannot just apply a uniform standard to assuage qualitatively different grievances of different groups considered under a larger umbrella. Hence, my argument in the OP: we need to approach the misvaluing of specific groups in ways that take into account value-specificity for those groups.

The justification is the dynamic I write about in the OP:

This, I believe, can only be effectively done if we isolate groups according to their grievances so we have some sort of goal or direction to go in. Of course, there has to be some continuity and consistency in grievance, and I think that we have that - although I’m no expert on the matter.

there has to be some continuity and consistency in grievance, and I think that we have that

I think I understand your principle here now. I just don’t see any justification. That there might be ‘continuity in grievance’ in the black, trans, or immigrant communities, for example, that there isn’t in the community of those in absolute poverty. I’m just not seeing how you’ve reached that conclusion, you seem to be taking it for granted and it isn’t at all obvious to me.

Nothing I am saying actually precludes there being continuity and consistency in grievance from those in absolute poverty. I’m just saying that we cannot simultaneously or efficiently address the problems of everyone in that group via the same standard unless the concomitant grievance is generalized throughout the group to the point that we can isolate that entire group. Those in absolute poverty undoubtedly do have consistent and continuous grievances - and we can solve them, for sure.